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Abstract
We study a model of path-vector routing in which nodes’ routing policies are based on subjective cost assessments of alternative
routes. The routes are constrained by the requirement that all routes to a given destination must be confluent. We show that it is
NP-hard to determine whether there is a set of stable routes. We also show that it is NP-hard to find a set of confluent routes that
minimizes the total subjective cost; it is hard even to approximate the minimum cost closely. These hardness results hold even for
very restricted classes of subjective costs.
We then consider a model in which the subjective costs are based on the relative importance nodes place on a small number
of objective cost measures. We show that a small number of confluent routing trees is sufficient for each node to have a route that
nearly minimizes its subjective cost. We show that this scheme is trivially strategy proof and that it can be computed easily with
a distributed algorithm. Furthermore, we prove a lower bound on the number of trees required to contain a (1+ )-approximately
optimal route for each node and show that our scheme is nearly optimal in this respect.
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1. Introduction
In any networked computation environment, routing (finding paths from each node in the network to every other
node) is an essential task. Two families of routing protocols are widely used: link-state routing protocols and path-
vector routing protocols. In link-state protocols, the state of the entire network is maintained by every single node; this
is updated whenever there is a change anywhere in the network. In a path-vector protocol, each node only maintains a
local map of the network that includes the paths currently used by neighboring nodes, leading to significant space and
communication savings. In this paper, we focus on path-vector routing protocols.
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With path-vector routing, routes are propagated by a node announcing its current path to a given destination to
some or all of its neighbors. A node i with many neighbors may thus receive announcements of many different routes
to a given destination j . It can then select (at least) one of these available routes as the route it will use to send its
traffic; subsequently, i can announce this chosen route (prefixed by i itself) to its neighbors. Proceeding in this manner,
every node in the network can eventually discover at least one route to destination j . Thus, one of the key decisions
that has to be made at each node is that of route selection: Given all the currently available routes to destination j ,
which one is traffic sent on?
At first glance, it may seem as though nodes should always pick the shortest route; in practice, however, node
preferences may be greatly influenced by other factors, such as perceived reliability or preferences over which
outgoing link is used. This is particularly important when nodes have some degree of autonomy (i.e., they are
controlled by different entities). In this case, each node may independently choose a routing policy that governs its
route selection. The resulting routing scheme is called policy-based routing, or policy routing for short. With policy
routing, the global routes depend on all the individual nodes’ policy choices. Achieving efficient routing thus requires
coordination of routing policies as well as attention to the incentives and preferences of autonomous nodes.
1.1. Path-vector routing in the Internet
Policy routing has chiefly been studied in the context of interdomain routing. The Internet is divided into many
Autonomous Systems (ASes). Loosely speaking, each AS is a subnetwork that is administered by a single organization.
Interdomain routing is the task of routing between different ASes. Currently, the only widely used protocol for
interdomain routing is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is a path-vector protocol that allows an AS to
“advertise” routes it currently uses to neighboring ASes.
AS route preferences are complex, and are largely dependent on the commercial relationships that an AS has
with other ASes. For this reason, BGP allows ASes complete freedom to pick a route according to their own routing
policies. However, BGP does place one important constraint on routing: it stipulates that an AS can only advertise a
route that the advertising AS itself currently uses. This is because of the way traffic is routed in the Internet: routers
examine the destination of incoming packets and simply forward the packet to the next hop on the current route to
that destination. At a given time, each AS typically has exactly one active route to the destination. Thus, the set of all
ASes’ routes to a given destination AS j must be confluent, i.e., they must form a tree rooted at j .
The policy-routing aspect of interdomain routing has recently received a lot of attention from researchers. Varadhan
et al. [10] observed that general policy routing could lead to route oscillations. Griffin, Shepherd, and Wilfong [7,6]
studied the following abstract model of general policy routing: each AS i’s policy is represented by a preference
ordering over all possible routes to a given destination j . At any given time, i inspects the routes all of its neighbors
are advertising to j and picks the one that is ranked highest. AS i then advertises this route (prefixed by i itself) to
all its neighbors. Griffin et al. proved that, in such a scenario, BGP may not converge to a set of stable paths; the
routes might keep oscillating as ASes continuously change their selection in response to their neighbors’ changes.
They further showed that, given a network and a set of route preferences, it is NP-complete to determine whether a set
of stable paths exists. In recent work, Feamster et al. [1] showed that instability can arise even for restricted routing
policies.
Feigenbaum et al. [4] extended the model of [7] by including cardinal preferences instead of preference orderings.
Specifically, they assume that AS i conceptually assigns each potential route a monetary value and then ranks routes
according to their value. The advantage of working with cardinal preferences is that a set of paths can be stabilized
by making payments to some of the ASes: although the ASes’ a priori preferences may have led to oscillation (in the
absence of payments), ASes preferences can be changed if they receive more money for using a less valuable route.
This is the basis for the mechanism-design approach to routing, which seeks to structure incentives so as to achieve
a stable, globally optimal set of routes; see [4] for further details. In the context of policy routing, the most natural
global goal is to select a set of confluent routes that maximizes the total welfare (the sum of all ASes’ values for
their selected routes). However, Feigenbaum et al. showed that, for general valuation functions, it is NP-hard to find a
welfare-maximizing set of routes; it is even NP-hard to approximate the maximum welfare to within a factor of n
1
4− ,
where n is the number of nodes. Thus, in this model too, general routing policies lead to computationally intractable
problems.
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The natural approach to get around the intractability results is to restrict either the network or the routing policy.
Restricting the network alone does not appear to be a very promising direction, because the hardness results hold even
for fairly simple networks that cannot be excluded without excluding many “Internet-like” networks. This has led
researchers to turn to restricted classes of preferences that can express a wide class of routing policies that ASes use in
practice. Feigenbaum et al. [4] study next-hop preferences – preferences in which an AS i’s value for a path depends
only on the next AS on the path – and show that, in this case, a welfare-maximizing set of routes can be found
in polynomial time. Next-hop preferences can capture the effects of i’s having different commercial relationships
with neighboring ASes. Similarly, in the ordinal-preference model, Gao and Rexford [5] show that, with the current
hierarchical Internet structure, BGP is certain to converge to a set of stable paths as long as every AS prefers a customer
route (i.e., a route in which the next hop is one of its customers) over a peer or provider route; this can also be viewed
as a next-hop restriction on preferences.
1.2. More expressive preference classes
There are many reasonable policies that cannot be expressed in terms of next-hop preferences alone. Although
commercial relationships are the primary determinant of current AS routing policies, understanding other classes of
policies that could be handled without abandoning the path-vector approach would be useful as the Internet continues
to evolve. In addition, new domains such as wireless ad hoc networks also involve loosely coupled autonomous nodes,
and could also benefit from policy-based routing protocols.
In this paper, we study other classes of routing policies that capture plausible node preferences. We examine
the global routing behavior under the confluence constraint that requires all routes to a destination to form a tree; as
discussed above, this is a natural requirement when packets are forwarded based on the destination alone. For example,
a node i might wish to avoid any route that goes through node k, either because it perceives k to be unreliable or
because k is a malicious competitor who would like to drop all of i’s traffic. This leads to the forbidden-set class of
routing policies: for each node i , there is a set of nodes Si such that i prefers any route that avoids Si over any route
that uses a node in Si . We can then ask the following questions: (1) If each node uses a forbidden-set routing policy,
will the path-vector routing protocol converge to a set of stable paths? and (2) Can we find a welfare-maximizing
routing tree, i.e., a set of confluent routes that maximizes the number of nodes i whose routes do not intersect the sets
Si? If the latter optimization problem were tractable, then this class of routing policies would be a candidate for a
mechanism-design solution as in [3].
Forbidden-set policies (and many others) can be framed in terms of subjective costs. Each node i assigns a cost
ci (k) to every other node k. Then, the “cost” perceived by node k for a route P is
∑
k∈P ci (k); node i prefers routes
with lower subjective cost. Subjective-cost routing is a natural generalization of lowest-cost routing (in which there is
a single objective measure of cost that all nodes agree upon). It is well known that lowest-cost routes can be computed
easily, and hence we hope that some more general class of subjective-cost routing policies will also be tractable.
However, we find that even very restricted subsets of subjective-cost policies lead to intractable optimization
problems. We show that, if all nodes rank paths based on subjective-cost assignments, it is still possible to have
an instance in which there is no stable-path solution. Further, given a network and subjective costs, it is NP-complete
to determine whether there is a set of stable paths. Moreover, the NP-completeness reduction only requires subjective
costs in the range {0, 1, 2} for each node. In the cardinal utility model, the outlook is not much brighter. We show that,
even if all subjective costs are either 0 or 1, it is NP-hard to find a set of routes that maximizes the overall welfare;
indeed, it is NP-hard even to approximate maximum welfare to within any factor. The forbidden-set routing policies
can be formulated in terms of 0-1 subjective costs, and hence optimizing for this class is also difficult. We then turn
to subjective costs with bounded ratios. We show that, if the subjective costs are restricted to lie in the range [1, 2],
the problem of finding a confluent tree with minimum total subjective cost is APX-hard; thus finding a solution that
is within a (1 + ) factor of optimal is intractable. In this case, however, an unweighted shortest-path tree provides a
trivial 2-approximation to the optimization problem.
In light of all these hardness results, we consider a more restricted scenario in which the differing subjective
cost assignments arise from differences in the relative importance placed on two objective metrics, such as latency
and reliability. Thus, we suppose that every path P has two objective costs l1(P) and l2(P). We assume that node
i evaluates the cost of path P as the convex combination λi l1(P) + (1 − λi )l2(P), where λi ∈ [0, 1] reflects the
importance i places on the first metric. Here, too, it is NP-hard to find a routing tree that closely approximates
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the maximum welfare. However, if we slightly relax the constraint that each node stores only a single route to the
destination, we show that it is possible to find a nearly optimal route, as follows. Given any  > 0, we can find a set
of O(log n) trees1 rooted at j with the following property: if each node i chooses the route it likes best among the
O(log n) alternatives, the overall welfare is within a (1 + ) factor of optimal. This solution can be implemented
by replacing each destination with a set of O(log n) logical destinations and then finding a lowest-cost routing
tree to each of these logical destinations. The results generalize to the convex combinations of d > 2 objective
metrics; O(d3d logd−1 n) trees are required in this case. This scheme is trivially strategy proof, and, further, it can be
implemented with an efficient distributed algorithm.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the subjective-cost model of routing
preferences. In Section 3, we study the stable-paths problem for path rankings based on subjective costs. In Sections 4
and 5, we study the problem of finding a routing tree that minimizes the total subjective cost.
2. Subjective-cost model for policy routing
In this section, we present the subjective-cost model of node preferences. The model involves each node i’s
assigning a cost ci (k) to every other node k. These costs are subjective, because there is no requirement that ci (.)
and ck(.) be consistent. We assume that each subjective cost ci (k) is non-negative. The total cost of n node i for a
route Pi j to destination j is
ci (Pi j ) =
∑
k∈Pi j
ci (k).
Here, the notation k ∈ Pi j is used to indicate that k is a transit node on the path Pi j ; i and j are thus excluded from
the summation. Node i wants to use a route Pi j that minimizes the cost ci (Pi j ).
The subjective-cost model can be used to express a wide range of preferences, but it does place some restrictions
on node preferences. For instance, a node i cannot prefer a path P over a path P ′ whose nodes are a strict subset of
P . The class of preferences that can be expressed as subjective costs includes
• Lowest-cost routing
If ci (k) is the actual cost of transiting node k, minimizing the path cost is exactly lowest-cost routing.
• Routing with a forbidden set
Let ci (.) take the following form: If k ∈ Si , ci (k) = 1, else ci (k) = 0. Then any route that avoids nodes in Si is
preferred by i over any route that involves a node in Si .
Subjective costs can form the basis for either ordinal preferences or cardinal utilities. In Section 3, we study the
stable-paths problem for path rankings based on subjective costs. In Sections 4 and 5, we study the problem of finding
a routing tree that minimizes the total subjective cost.
3. Stable paths with subjective costs
The Stable Paths Problem (SPP), introduced by Griffin et al. [6], is defined as follows. We are given a graph with
a specified destination node j . Each other node i represents a node; there is an edge between two nodes if and only
if they exchange routing information with each other. Thus, a path from i to j in the graph corresponds to a potential
route from node i to the destination. Each node i ranks all potential routes to destination j . A route assignment is
a specification of a path Pi j for each node i such that the union of all the routes forms a tree rooted at j (i.e., the
confluence property is satisfied). A route assignment is called stable if, for every node i , the following property holds:
for every neighbor a of i , node i does not strictly prefer the path aPaj over the path Pi j ; in other words, i would not
want to change its current route to any of the other routes currently being advertised by its neighbors. The stable-paths
problem is solvable if there is a stable route assignment.
Griffin et al. [7,6] have shown that there are instances of SPP that are unsolvable, and, further, that it is NP-complete
to determine whether a given SPP is solvable. Their constructions used preferences that cannot be directly expressed
1 The dependence on  is detailed in Section 5.
J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 175–189 179
Fig. 1. A bad triangle.
as subjective-cost preferences. This leads us to hope that, for subjective-cost preferences, the stable-paths problem
might be tractable. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In this section, we prove that these hardness results extend to
subjective-cost preferences.
Assume that the rankings assigned by nodes are based on an underlying subjective-cost assignment. Then, the
stable paths problem can be viewed in terms of a strategic game, as follows. The players of this game are the nodes.
Given a graph G(V, E) with a specific destination j and a subjective-cost function c : V (G) × V (G) → R, the
next-hop game is defined as follows. Nodes correspond to the vertices of graph G. The strategy space for node i is
the set N (i) of neighboring nodes in the graph; thus, node i’s picking the route advertised by a neighboring node a
corresponds to i’s playing strategy a. Given a vector of strategies (one for each player), the cost incurred by player
i is the subjective cost of its route to the destination; if there is no route from i to the destination, i’s cost is ∞. A
vector of strategies is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if, given the strategies of all the other nodes, no node could
decrease its subjective cost by changing its strategy. A pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium strategy profile must result in
every node having some route to j , and, hence, it must correspond to a valid route assignment. Thus, proving that an
SPP is solvable is equivalent to proving that the corresponding next-hop game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1. The bad triangle is defined as follows. It is a graph G with vertex set {a, b, c, a′, b′, c′, r} and edge set
{aa′, a′r, cc′, c′r, bb′, b′r, ab, bc, ca}. Set ca(c) = ca(c′) = 0; cb(a) = cb(a′) = 0; and cc(b) = cc(b′) = 0. All other
subjective costs are set to 1. A bad triangle is shown in Fig. 1. (This construction is based on the bad gadget defined
in [7].)
In the bad triangle, node a prefers the path (a, c, c′, r) to the path (a, a′, r), node b prefers the path (b, a, a′, r) to
the path (b, b′, r), and node c prefers the path (c, b, b′, r) to the path (c, c′, r). It follows from the arguments in [7]
that this network is not solvable.
We now show that, as in the case of unrestricted routing policies, it is NP-complete to determine if an SPP based
on subjective-cost preferences is solvable.
Theorem 1. Given an instance of the next-hop game, it is NP-complete to decide whether it has a pure Nash
equilibrium or not.
Proof. The proof is based on the corresponding NP-completeness proof in [7]. We give a reduction from the
3SAT problem to this problem. In an instance of the 3SAT problem, we are given a set of variables {x1, . . . , xn}
and a set of clauses {C1, . . . ,Cm}. Each clause Ci contains three literals xi1, xi2, and xi3. Given an instance
({x1, . . . , xn}, {C1,C2, . . . ,Cm}) of the 3SAT problem, we construct the following next-hop game. For each variable
xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we put three vertices xi , x¯i , and yi in the graph. For each clause C j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), we
put a bad triangle. We also put a separate vertex r in the graph. Let the center and three outer vertices of the
bad triangle corresponding to the j th clause be v j , v j1, v j2, and v j3 respectively. The edge set of the graph is
E(G) = {yi xi , yi x¯i , xi yi−1, x¯i yi−1, x1r, x¯1r , v jr, v j1yn, v j2yn, v j3yn|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}. The structure of
the graph is depicted in Fig. 2. If vertex vk j corresponds to the literal xi , then cvk j (x¯i ) = 2 and cvk j (xi ) = 0. If it
corresponds to x¯i , then cvk j (xi ) = 2 and cvk j (x¯i ) = 0.
Further, we set cxi (yi ) = cx¯i (yi ) = 1 and cyi (xi+1) = cyi (x¯i+1) = 1. Finally, we set cyn (c j ) = cc j (yn) = 1 for
each clause j . These assignments are to ensure that, in any Nash equilibrium, all the bad-triangle centers v j connect
directly to r , and all the xi , x¯i , yi nodes use paths directed towards the left of Fig. 2. Note that, in any pure Nash
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Fig. 2. The reduction from 3SAT.
equilibrium, there is a unique path from yn to the root r . For each i , this path passes through either xi or x¯i , indicating
an assignment of xi in the 3SAT instance.
The subjective costs of vertices inside bad triangles follow the pattern of the bad-triangle example. All other
subjective costs are set to zero. Thus, for a set of routes to be stable, for each clause j , at least one of the vertices
{v j1, v j2, v j3} must use the path through yn to the root, because there is no stable set of routes through v j .
We now show that, if there exists an assignment of variables that satisfies all the clauses, then there exists a pure
Nash equilibrium in the next-hop game. We can find this Nash equilibrium by putting a path through the true literals
from yn to r . We then assign all nodes v jk corresponding to a true literal the route through yn . This route has zero
subjective cost, and so v jk has no incentive to change routes. Each clause contains at least one true literal, and hence
each bad triangle is broken up, and the remaining vertices can be assigned stable paths to r through the center v j .
Conversely, if there is a pure Nash equilibrium in the next-hop game, assign all literals corresponding to the path
from yn to r the value true. In this way, for each i , either xi is true or x¯i is true, but not both, and hence we have
a valid variable assignment. There are no bad triangles in the Nash equilibrium, and so each clause must contain a
vertex v jk that uses a route through yn to r . Note that v jk always has the option of switching to a path through c j
with cost 1. The path stability implies that v jk does not have a subjective cost of 2 for the path through yn ; hence, the
literal corresponding to v jk must be assigned true. There is such a vertex for each clause j , and hence this variable
assignment satisfies all the clauses. This shows that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the next-hop game if and
only if there exists a satisfying assignment in the 3SAT instance. 
4. The minimum-subjective-cost tree (MSCT) problem
In this section, we assume that the subjective cost ci (k) is an actual monetary amount that is measured in the same
unit across all nodes. A natural overall goal is then to minimize the sum of subjective costs, i.e., to pick a set of
routes {Pi j } that minimizes∑ j ∑i ci (Pi j ). However, there is a constraint that all the routes to a single destination j
must form a tree, because the packets are actually sent by forwarding. This constraint applies independently to each
destination, and so we can consider the simpler problem of routing to a single destination j .
Thus, we can frame the subjective-cost minimization problem as follows.
Subjective-cost minimization: We are given a graph G, a set of cost functions {ci (.)}, and a specific destination j .
We want to find a set of routes {Pi j } and payments pi to each node i such that:
(1) The routes {Pi j } form a tree rooted at j .
(2) Among all such trees, the selected tree minimizes the sum
∑
i
∑
k∈Pi j ci (k).
We first prove that, for arbitrary cost functions, the MSCT problem is NP-hard to approximate within any
multiplicative factor. Let cmax = maxv,u∈V (G) cv(u) and cmin = minv,u∈V (G) cv(u). Then, we have the following
result:
Theorem 2. It is NP-hard to approximate the MSCT problem within a factor better than cmax
cminn2
, where n is the number
of vertices. In particular, it is NP-hard to approximate MSCT within any factor if cmin = 0 and cmax > 0.
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Fig. 3. The reduction from the set-cover problem.
Proof. We prove that, if we can approximate MSCT in polynomial time, then we can solve the k-DISPATH
problem in polynomial time. In the k-DISPATH problem, we are given a graph G = (V, E) and k pairs of
vertices (s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sk, tk), and we want to find k vertex disjoint paths from si to ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The k-DISPATH problem is among the ones that Karp originally showed to be NP-hard [8]. From an instance
I = (G, {(si , ti )|1 ≤ i ≤ k}), we construct the following instance J = (G ′, r, {cv : |v ∈ V (G ′)}) of the MSCT
problem: V (G ′) = V (G) ∪ {r} and E(G ′) = E(G) ∪ {tir |1 ≤ i ≤ k}. We define csi (t j ) = cmax if i 6= j . For all the
other cases cv(u) = cmin. Thus the subjective cost of a tree in which ti is not on the path from si to the root is at most
cminn2, because each path has at most n vertices on it. The subjective cost of a tree in which si and t j are on the same
path in the tree, for i 6= j , is at least cmax. It is apparent that there is a tree without a pair (si , t j ) for i 6= j on a path to
the root if and only if I is a yes instance of the k-DISPATH problem. Thus, distinguishing between the case in which
the total subjective cost is at most cminn2 and the case in which it is at least cmax is NP-hard. In particular, if cmin = 0
and cmax > 0, we can use any finite approximation algorithm for MSCT to solve the k-DISPATH problem. 
Note that the above theorem does not show hardness for the special cases in which cmaxcmin is not large. This may be a
reasonable restriction; however, we now show that this also yields an intractable optimization problem. In particular,
we study the special case in which all subjective costs are either 1 or 2. We call this problem the (1, 2)-MSCT problem.
In the following, we give a hardness result for the (1, 2)-MSCT problem.
Theorem 3. The (1, 2)-MSCT problem is APX-hard.
Proof. We first prove that the problem is NP-hard and then modify the reduction to prove APX-hardness. We give a
reduction from the set-cover problem to (1, 2)-MSCT. Consider an instance I of the set-cover problemwith n elements
{E1, E2, . . . , En} andm sets {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}. We construct an instanceJ = (G, r, {cv : V (G) → {1, 2}|v ∈ V (G)})
of (1, 2)-MSCT problem as follows. Vertices s j and p j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, correspond to the set S j in I. Vertex ei , for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, corresponds to the element Ei in I. There are two other vertices, the root r and a helper vertex h. Thus,
V (G) = {r, h} ∪ {s j , p j |1 ≤ j ≤ m} ∪ {ei |1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Vertex ei is connected to all vertices s j such that Ei ∈ S j
in I. There is an edge between s j and p j , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and there is an edge from each s j to the helper vertex
h. All vertices p j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and vertex h are connected to r . We also set cei (h) = 2, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
cs j (p j ) = 2. For all other v and u, cv(u) = 1. Graph G is depicted in Fig. 3.
We claim that there is a set cover of size k in I if and only if there is tree with total subjective cost 2n + m + k in
J .
If there is a family of sets F of size k that covers all the elements in I, then we can construct the following solution
in J . If S j ∈ F then connect s j to p j to r . Each ei is connected to some S j ∈ F in the tree; because all elements are
covered in the set cover, all vertices ei will be included in the tree. For any vertex s j such that S j 6∈ F , connect s j to
h, and finally, connect h to r . It is straightforward to check that the subjective cost of this tree is exactly 2n + m + k.
Conversely, if there is a tree T of cost 2n+m+ k in J , then there is a set cover of size k in I. First we can assume
that all the edges to r are in T , because, if they were not, we could add them and remove an edge from T to decrease
the total subjective cost. Also we can assume that, if there is an edge ei s j in T , then s j p j ∈ E(T ), because otherwise
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s jh would be in E(T ), and we could remove the edge s jh and add s j p j to T to get another tree with lower or equal
subjective cost. Knowing these properties of the tree T , we can easily construct the set cover of size k from T . This
completes the NP-hardness proof.
For APX-hardness, we need to look at a special case of the set-cover problem. The case in which each element
occurs two times and each set is of size at most 3 is APX-complete [9].2 For this special case of the set-cover problem,
we know that n ≤ m ≤ 1.5n and that k ≤ m; thus, there is a constant c such that 2n + m + k ≤ ck. This means
that a 1 + -approximation for the (1, 2)-MSCT problem gives a (1 + c)-approximation for this special case of set
cover. 
Theorem 3 shows that, for sufficiently small , it is hard to find a (1 + )-approximation for the (1, 2)-MSCT
problem. However, we note that finding a 2-approximation is easy: simply ignore the costs, and construct an
unweighted shortest-path tree with destination j . This is optimal to within a factor of 2, because the number of
nodes on the shortest path from i to j is a lower bound on the subjective cost ci (Pi j ) for any path Pi j from i to j .
5. An alternative model: Subjective choice of metrics
In this section, we consider a more restricted preference model. We assume that there are multiple objective metrics
on routes (e.g., cost and latency), and nodes’ preferences differ only in the relative importance they accord to different
metrics. This is a non-trivial restriction only when the number of objective metrics is small; here, we first consider the
case in which there are only two objective metrics on a route. The results are generalized to d > 2 objective metrics
in Section 5.1.
Formally, suppose that any transit node k has two associated objective “length” values l1(k) and l2(k). Both the
length values can be extended to additive path metrics, i.e., we can define l1(Pi j ) = ∑k∈Pi j l1(k) and l2(Pi j ) =∑
k∈Pi j l2(k). Note that we use the term “metric” for the ease of presentation and that we do not impose the triangle
equality on the length functions l1 and l2.
Each node i has a private parameter λi , 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1. Node i’s subjective cost for the route Pi j is given by
ci (Pi j ) = λi l1(Pi j )+ (1− λi )l2(Pi j ), i.e., Node i’s preferences are modeled as a convex combination of the two path
metrics.
It is easy to show that the APX-hardness proof for the (1, 2)-MSCT problem (Theorem 3) can be adapted to the
two-metric routing problem as well:
Theorem 4. In the subjective-metric model, it is APX-hard to find a tree T that minimizes total subjective cost.
Proof. In the construction of Theorem 3, assign l1(h) = 2, l2(h) = 1; ∀ j l1(p j ) = 1, l2(p j ) = 2; and
∀ j l1(s j ) = 2, l2(s j ) = 1. Assign λei = 1 for all i , and λs j = 0 for all j . Then, the subjective costs are exactly
as specified in the proof of Theorem 3, and the APX-hardness follows. 
We now investigate whether relaxing the confluent-tree routing constraint would lead to stronger results. If we
allowed the routes to be completely arbitrary, then clearly we could have optimal routing: each node could simply
use the route it liked the best. However, supporting these routes would either require source routing (i.e., the packet
header contains a full path) or a massive increase in storage at each router to record the forwarding link for each
source and destination. Instead, we ask whether we can get positive results with only a small growth in routers’ space
requirements.
Our approach is to use a small number r of confluent routing trees T1, T2, . . . , Tr to each destination j . Then, each
node i evaluates its subjective cost to j in each of the routing trees and picks a tree Tti that minimizes this subjective
cost. Node i then marks each packet it sends with the header 〈 j, ti 〉. Each node en route stores its route to j along each
tree T j ; thus, it can inspect the header of each incoming packet and forward along the appropriate route.
We can prove the following result:
Theorem 5. Suppose that, for transit node k , l1(k) and l2(k) are integers bounded by a polynomial, i.e., l1(k), l2(k) <
nc for some constant c. Then, for any given  > 0, there is a set of routing trees T1, T2, . . . , Tr with r =
O( 1

[log n + log( 1

)]) such that
2 In fact, this is the vertex-cover problem in bounded-degree graphs.
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For each node i , there is a tree Tti such that ci (Tti ) ≤ (1+ )ci (P∗i j ), where P∗i j is the minimum-subjective-cost
route from i to j .
Further, this set of trees can be constructed in polynomial time.
Proof. Let α = (1 + ). We now show how to construct an appropriate set of trees. Each tree Tt in our collection is
the shortest-path tree for a specific convex combination of the two metrics. We name the trees after the metrics they
optimize:
T∞: l1(·), with ties broken by minimum l2(·).
T−∞: l2(·), with ties broken by minimum l1(·).
Tt : lt (·) = αt1+αt l1(·)+ 11+αt l2(·) for t ∈ {−k,−(k − 1), . . . ,− 1, 0, 1, . . . , k}, where k = dlogα(2−1nc+1)e.
Thus, there are a total of r = 2k + 3 = O(log n) trees. These trees can be constructed with r shortest-path
computations and hence can be done in polynomial time. Now, consider a node i , and let λi ∈ [0, 1] denote its private
choice of metric. If λi = 1, then clearly T∞ will contain the optimal route from i to j . Similarly, if λi = 0, T−∞ will
contain the optimal route from i to j . Hence, we restrict our attention to the case in which λi ∈ (0, 1).
Let P ti j denote the path from i to j in Tt , and P
∗
i j denote the path from i to j to which i assigns minimum subjective
cost. We divide all values of λ ∈ (0, 1) into 4 cases.
Case (i): λi1−λi > 2
−1nc+1
Now, if l1(P∗i j ) = 0, then T−∞ must contain P∗i j , because it is the optimal path under the l2 metric. If l1(P∗i j ) ≥ 1, we
get
ci (P
∞
i j ) = λi l1(P∞i j )+ (1− λi )l2(P∞i j )
≤ λi l1(P∗i j )+ (1− λi )l2(P∞i j )
≤ λi l1(P∗i j )+ /2 (using the bound on node costs)
≤ (1+ )ci (P∗i j ).
Case (ii): 1 ≤ λi1−λi ≤ 2−1nc+1
Let
t =
⌊
logα
λi
1− λi
⌋
.
Then, we have
αt ≤ λi
1− λi ≤ α
t+1.
Now, because P ti j is the optimal tree under metric lt , we have
αt l1(P
t
i j )+ l2(P ti j ) ≤ αt l1(P∗i j )+ l2(P∗i j ).
Then,
1
1− λi ci (P
t
i j ) =
λi
1− λi l1(P
t
i j )+ l2(P ti j )
≤ αt+1l1(P ti j )+ l2(P ti j )
≤ α(αt l1(P ti j )+ l2(P ti j ))
≤ α(αt l1(P∗i j )+ l2(P∗i j ))
≤ α
(
λi
1− λi l1(P
∗
i j )+ l2(P∗i j )
)
= 1
1− λi αci (P
∗
i j ).
184 J. Feigenbaum et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 378 (2007) 175–189
Fig. 4. Network used in Theorem 6.
Case (iii): 1 < 1−λi
λi
≤ 2−1nc+1
The same argument as Case (ii) shows that some Tt is a good approximation.
Case (iv): 1−λi
λi
> 2−1nc+1
The same argument as Case (i) shows that either T∞ or T−∞ is a good approximation.
Thus, in each case, one of the routing trees contains a route to j that has a subjective cost of at most
(1+ )ci (P∗i j ). 
There are several points worth noting about this scheme. (1) It achieves a result that is slightly stronger than our
initial goal — it approximately maximizes each individual node’s welfare, not just the sum of all nodes’ welfare.
(2) The computation of the trees is oblivious to the nodes’ preference information. Thus, if we assume that the
objective costs are common knowledge (or verifiable), this scheme is trivially a strategy-proof mechanism. (3) Each
tree computation involves computing lowest-cost routes for a specific objective metric. Thus, it is easily computed
within the framework of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). (In the terminology of Feigenbaum et al. [3,4], there is
a natural BGP-based distributed algorithm for this scheme.)
We now prove a corresponding lower bound that shows that Theorem 5 is nearly optimal.
Theorem 6. Let  > 0 be given. There is a family of instances of the subjective-metric routing problem, with all
weights in [0, nc] for some constant c, such that the following property holds:
Any set of routing trees that contains a (1+ )-approximately optimal path Pi j for each i must have Ω(log n/)
trees.
(Here, n is the number of nodes of the network.)
Proof. First, consider the network shown in Fig. 4: The destination j has r neighbors x1, x2, . . . , xr . There is a node
a that is adjacent to each of these r nodes, and there are r more nodes y1, . . . , yr that are adjacent to a.
Let α = 1+ . The transit lengths are set as follows. For each node xk , set l1(xk) = α2r−2k and l2(xk) = α2r+2k .
For a, set l1(a) = l2(a) = 0; the lengths of nodes yi are irrelevant, because they cannot be transit nodes. Finally, for
each node yi , define λyi = (1− α−4i ). Hence, for a route P , we have
cyi (P) =
α4i
α4i + 1 l1(P)+
1
α4i + 1 l2(P).
We now show that, for these costs and preferences, the minimum-subjective-cost route from yi to j is axi j , and
that, further, no other path is within a (1+ ) factor of optimal.
Let Pk denote the path axk j . Then, yi ’s subjective cost for this path is
cyi (Pk) = λyi l1(xi )+ (1− λyi )l2(xk)
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= α
4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2k + 1
α4i + 1α
2r+2k .
Thus,
cyi (Pi ) =
α4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2i .
Now, we evaluate cyi (Pk) for i 6= k. Consider two cases:
Case (i): k > i
In this case,
cyi (Pk) =
α4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2k + 1
α4i + 1α
2r+2k
= α
4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2k [1+ α4(k−i)]
>
α4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2iα2(k−i)
> αcyi (Pi ).
Case (ii): k < i
In this case, we have
cyi (Pk) =
α4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2k + 1
α4i + 1α
2r+2k
= α
4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2k [1+ α4(k−i)]
>
α4i
α4i + 1α
2r−2iα2(i−k)
> αcyi (Pi ).
Thus, if a solution contains a (1+)-approximately optimal path for every yi , it must contain Pi . In any one routing
tree, a can have only a single route to j ; thus, at least r routing trees are required to achieve this.
Finally, observe that the costs are all bounded below by 1 and bounded above by α4r . For an n-node graph, we can
set r = c log n4 logα = O( log n ) to ensure that all costs are at most nc; then, the graph in Fig. 4 can be embedded into the
n-node graph. 
5.1. Generalization to more than 2 metrics
In this section, we show that Theorems 5 and 6 generalize to the case in which there are d > 2 objective metrics,
and a node’s subjective cost is a convex combination of these metrics.
Theorem 7. Suppose that, for transit node k, all lengths l1(k), l2(k), . . . , ld(k) are integers bounded by a polynomial,
i.e. , l j (k) < nc for some constant c. Then, for any given  > 0,  < 1, there is a set of routing trees T1, T2, . . . , Tr
with total number of trees r = O(d3d [ (c+1) log n+log( 4 )log(1+) ]d−1) such that:
For each node i , there is a tree Tti such that ci (Tti ) ≤ (1+ )ci (P∗i j ), where P∗i j is the minimum-subjective-cost
route from i to j .
Further, this set of trees can be constructed in polynomial time for any constant d.
Proof. The proof, like Theorem 5, uses the idea of rounding the preferences to a bounded grid. The only subtle detail
is to handle the case in which i’s optimal path has zero costs in some metrics. We do this by including, for every subset
of metrics, a tree that preferentially selects paths with zero cost on that subset.
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Let α = 3√1+ . First, let us define the set of trees constructed. Let k = dlogα(4−1nc+1)e. Each such tree is
indexed by a pair ( jˆ, Eh), where jˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, Eh ∈ {−∞,−k,−(k − 1), . . . ,−1, 0,∞}d , and h jˆ = 0. The
corresponding cost function is defined by
c
( jˆ,Eh)(P) =
∑
j
αh j l j (P)∑
a,ha 6=∞ αia
.
For each such cost function, we construct the corresponding minimum-cost tree T
( jˆ,Eh). Note that the cost of a path
may be infinite; if there is no path from i that has a finite cost under T
( jˆ,Eh), we can include an arbitrary path from i in
this tree.
Note that jˆ does not influence the cost function; it merely indicates one metric that has the maximum weightage
under c
( jˆ,Eh). It follows that multiple index pairs ( jˆ, Eh) may correspond to the same cost metric, and hence the
same tree. As we are proving an upper bound on the number of trees required, this redundancy is not problematic.
For fixed jˆ , there are (k + 3)d−1 legal values for Eh. Thus, the total number of trees constructed is bounded by
d(k + 3)d−1 = O(dkd−1) = O(d3d [ (c+1) log n+log( 4 )log(1+) ]d−1).
We now show that this set of trees contains, for each node i , a path that approximately minimizes i’s subjective
cost. i’s subjective cost is a convex combination of the metrics, and hence can be represented as
ci (P) =
∑
j
λi, j l j (P)
where the λi, j values are non-negative and sum to 1. Let P∗ be the path from i that minimizes i’s subjective cost.
We need to prove that there is a path in one of the constructed trees that approximates the subjective cost (to i) of P∗.
First, consider the case ci (P∗) = 0. Consider the tree with index ( jˆ, Eh) defined as follows: h j = −∞ if λi, j = 0,
and h j = 0 otherwise. jˆ is picked such that h jˆ = 0 (there is at least one such jˆ , because not all λi, j can be zero).
It follows that c
( jˆ,Eh)(P
∗) must be 0. The optimal path PEh from i in T( jˆ,Eh) must hence have zero cost under c( jˆ,Eh).
Therefore, l j (PEh) must be zero whenever λi, j > 0, and so PEh must also have zero cost under metric ci . Thus, in this
case, the constructed paths contain an exactly optimal path for i .
Now, suppose that ci (P∗) > 0. Let S = { j |l j (P∗) > 0} be the set of base metrics under which P∗ has positive
cost. Now, pick jˆ to maximize λi, j within S:
jˆ = argmax
j∈S
λi, j .
Note that λi, jˆ > 0, because ci (P
∗) > 0. Let i j = logα λi, jλi, jˆ ; then, i j ∈ [−∞, 0].
We now select a vector Eh as follows:
∀ j /∈ S, h j = ∞
∀ j ∈ S, i j ≥ −k, h j = bi jc
∀ j ∈ S, i j < −k, h j = −∞.
Let PEh be the optimal path from i to j in T( jˆ,Eh). We now show that it is nearly optimal in terms of i’s subjective cost.
First, observe that P∗ has finite cost under c
( jˆ,Eh), because, by construction, l j (P
∗) = 0 whenever h j = ∞. Next,
observe that we do not alter the cost much by rounding all sufficiently small i j to −∞, because l jˆ (P∗) ≥ 1:∑
j |i j<−k
αi j l j (P
∗) ≤ dα−knc+1 ≤ (/4) ≤ (/4)l jˆ (P∗).
(Here, we have used the fact that the maximum cost of a path, in any base metric, is at most n · nc = nc+1.)
This gives us a bound:∑
j
αi j l j (P
∗) ≤ (1+ /4)
∑
j |i j≥−k
αi j l j (P
∗)
∑
j
αi j l j (P
∗) ≤ α(1+ /4)
∑
j |i j≥−k
αh j l j (P
∗) (because αik ≤ α · αhk ).
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Now, we can bound the cost of path P∗ in the cost metric c
( jˆ,Eh).
c
( jˆ,Eh)(P
∗) =
∑
j α
h j l j (P∗)∑
a,ha 6=∞ αha
≥
∑
j α
h j l j (P∗)∑
a α
ia
(increasing the denominator)
≥ 1
α(1+ /4)
∑
j α
i j l j (P∗)∑
a α
ia
≥ 1
α(1+ /4)ci (P
∗).
Note that c
( jˆ,Eh)(PEh) ≤ c( jˆ,Eh)(P∗), because the tree T( jˆ,Eh) is a lowest-cost tree. Further, PEh must have finite cost in
this metric, and hence l j (PEh) = 0 whenever l j (P∗) = 0. Thus, we get
ci (PEh) =
∑
j α
i j l j (PEh)∑
a α
ia
≤
∑
j α
i j l j (PEh)∑
a,ha 6=∞ αia
(reducing the denominator)
≤
∑
j α
i j l j (PEh)∑
a,ha 6=∞ αha
(reducing the denominator)
≤ α
∑
j α
h j l j (PEh)∑
a,ha 6=∞ αha
(using αi j < α · αh j )
≤ αc
( jˆ,Eh)PEh .
Combining, we get that ci (PEh) ≤ α2(1 + /4)ci P∗. For  < 1, we have (1 + /4) ≤ 3
√
1+ , so ci (PEh) ≤
(1+ )ci (P∗). Thus, PEh is an approximately optimal path for i . 
Theorem 8. Let  > 0 be given and d > 2 be given. There is a family of instances of the subjective-metric routing
problem, with all weights in [0, nc] for some constant c, such that the following property holds:
Any set of routing trees that contains a (1 + )-approximately optimal path for each i must have
Ω(( log nd log d+d log(1+) )
d−1) trees.
(Here, n is the number of nodes of the network.)
Proof. Consider the network shown in Fig. 5. The destination w has m neighbors x1, x2, . . . , xm . There is a node w′
that is adjacent to each of these m nodes, and there are n more nodes y1, . . . , yn that are adjacent to w′. Consider all
integer vectors Ei = (i1, i2, . . . , id−1, 1) ∈ [1, r ]d . There are rd−1 such vectors. We set m = rd−1 and correspond each
vector Ei to one of the vertices x j . Thus, we denote by x Ei the vertex x j corresponding to vector Ei .
Let α = 1 + . Now we define the transit lengths as follows. For each node x Ei with Ei = (i1, . . . , id−1, 1), we set
l j (x Ei ) = t i j+r−a(Ei) for 1 ≤ j ≤ d where a(Ei) =
∑d−1
j=1 i j
d and t is a constant that is fixed later. For w
′, set l j (w′) = 0
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d; the lengths of nodes y Ei are irrelevant, because they cannot be transit nodes. Finally, for m nodes
y Ei , define λy Ei , j = t−i j for 1 ≤ j ≤ d − 1 and λy Ei ,d = 1. For the other n − m vertices, λyk , j = 1d for 1 ≤ j ≤ d for
m < k ≤ n.
Let P Ei be the path (w′, x Ei , w). For a route P Ei , we have
cy Ei (P Ei ) = dtr−a(
Ei).
We now show that, for these costs and preferences, and by setting t such that log t ≥ d(log d+logα) the minimum-
subjective-cost route from y Ei to j via P Ei , and that, further, no other path is within a (1 + ) factor of optimal. y Ei ’s
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Fig. 5. Network used in Theorem 8.
subjective cost for path P Ei ′ , we claim that
cy Ei (P Ei ′) ≥ max1≤ j≤d t
i ′j−i j · tr−a(Ei ′)
≥ αdtr−a(Ei)
≥ αcy Ei (P Ei ).
To see the second inequality, we need to show that for a number j (1 ≤ j ≤ d), t i ′j−i j+a(Ei)−a(Ei ′) ≥ αd. Assuming
Ei 6= Ei ′, there exists an index j such that i ′j − i j + a(Ei)− a(Ei ′) ≥ 1d . Thus, in order to prove the claim it is sufficient to
prove that t
1
d ≥ αd , but this is an immediate consequence of log t ≥ d logα + d log d.
This shows that if a solution contains a (1+)-approximately optimal path for every y Ei , it must contain P Ei . In any
one routing tree, w′ can have only a single route to w; thus, at least m = rd−1 routing trees are required to achieve
this.
Now, if there is an upper bound of nc on the subjective costs, we can set tr = Θ(nc). By setting log t =
Θ(d log d + d logα), r = Θ( c log nlog t ) = Θ( c log nd log d+d logα ). Therefore, we need m = rd−1 = Θ([ c log nd log d+d logα ]d−1)
routing trees. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied classes of ordinal and cardinal preferences based on subjective costs. The subjective-
cost preference model is intuitively appealing, and it is very expressive. However, our results show that, even if the
costs are restricted to a very small range, unstructured subjectivity leads to intractable problems in both models: NP-
completeness of the stable paths problem for ordinal preferences and APX-hardness of the minimum-subjective-cost
tree problem for cardinal preferences.
The root cause of these hardness results appears to be the high dimension of the space of node preferences. Thus,
it is necessary to work with models that provide a more consistent global structure. In Section 5, we consider the case
in which there are two objective cost metrics, and nodes differ in the relative importance they place on the first metric.
For example, nodes may agree on the latency and packet-loss rate of each node in the network but have subjective
opinions about the relative importance of latency and loss rate. Thus, in this model, the space of all node types is one-
dimensional. We showed that it is possible to select a small number (O( 1

[log n+log( 1

)]) for a (1+)-approximation)
of representative types such that every nodes’ preferences are closely approximated by one of the representatives; then,
by picking a set of routing trees, each of which is optimized for a specific representative type, we can guarantee each
node a route that (1+ )-approximately minimizes its subjective cost. Further, this scheme is easy to implement, even
in the distributed-computing context: each destination can be replaced by a small number of logical destinations, and
a lowest-cost routing algorithm (e.g., the Bellman–Ford algorithm) can be used for each logical destination.
It is also possible that other models that restrict the subjectivity of the costs in some way may yield positive
results. For example, the nodes’ subjective costs for a given transit node k are random variables drawn from a specific
distribution. Finding such models that are both realistic and tractable is an interesting avenue for future research.
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